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A B S T R A C T   
Quantifying reputation loss (RL) due to pipeline damage is commonly generalized based on the owner’s defi-
nition. This one-way perspective of portraying RL is unfair and unrealistic and consequently miscalculates the 
impact assessment of pipeline damage; hence, inaccurate risk prediction. It is crucial to develop a model to 
quantify qualitative RL to avoid unpredicted risk. Thus, this article provides a framework for a procedure to 
calculate RL by utilizing the factors identified in a previous study. In this paper (Part 1), the prioritization of 
factors based on the stakeholders’ perspectives is presented. The factors were grouped into stakeholder- 
influenced categories and prioritized by a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process based on the feedback gained from 
the stakeholders, i.e., investors, customers, employees and the public. The result shows that factor D3, “Accident 
severity”, was ranked highest by all stakeholders. The priority vector for each factor obtained was assigned as a 
weight of the factor. The pipeline owner’s reputation loss model (RLM) is developed by applying the obtained 
priority vectors in the subsequent paper (Part 2). The developed model was verified by experts as a compre-
hensive, clear, objective, practical and moderately reliable model. The model was applied to a case study and 
eventually produced a lower risk value when compared with the currently used model. It is proven that RL 
factors can be quantitatively measured and can simultaneously improve pipeline damage impact assessment. 
Thus, a risk-based inspection schedule can be managed comprehensively.   
1. Introduction 
A minor or major accident in oil and gas (O&G) industry results in 
financial and reputation losses (Amir-Heidari et al., 2016; Renjith et al., 
2018). A comprehensive Pipeline Integrity Management Programme 
(PIMP) is vital for the maintenance of a safe and reliable O&G pipeline. 
A PIMP consists of a foundation of pipeline inspection, assessment, 
mitigation and communication aimed at minimizing the risk of a pipe-
line failure to “as low as reasonably practicable”. PIMPs have experi-
enced significant changes since the early 2000s. A well-planned PIMP is 
necessary to avoid pipeline damage and reduce the impact of failure 
events. A PIMP secures the annual profit margins of pipeline owners and 
protects their reputations. 
The time-based inspection previously used in PIMPs has been 
improved by the implementation of a risk-based inspection (RBI). An 
RBI allows pipeline owners to choose the most cost-effective pipeline 
inspection scheme, optimizing maintenance scheduling and reducing 
unnecessary inspections. As a part of an RBI module, risk of pipeline 
damage is defined as the product of the likelihood or frequency of 
pipeline damage and the impact or consequence of such an event. The 
existing consequence assessments are quite effective in evaluating the 
monetary loss caused by pipeline failure, such as the number of fatalities 
and injuries, cost of asset damage, cost of production loss, and cost of 
environmental pollution fines. However, as a part of the critical assets of 
a company, quantifying the loss of its reputation in dollars and cents is 
quite difficult (Gavious et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012; Khakzad et al., 
2017). Despite its qualitative nature, the actual cost of pipeline damage 
cannot be determined while neglecting the contributing factors of 
reputational loss. 
There are many challenges encountered in estimating the cost of a 
company’s RL, including its time dependency, difficulties in quantifying 
the reputational threat factors in terms of monetary values, and a lack of 
the identification of the impact of RL towards the company’s local 
conditions, e.g., the stakeholders of the company. Onshore pipelines 
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buried underground are laid across various types of geographical sur-
faces with different demographics and populations. These varying con-
ditions lead to different impacts on a company’s reputation in the event 
of a pipeline failure. For example, the impact of a pipeline failure 
causing an explosion in Europe is different from that of a similar event in 
Nigeria due to their different public education levels. Public awareness 
of safe and reliable pipeline operations also varies between countries. 
The risk assessment for pipeline damage practice currently includes 
an assessment of the failure event’s effects on an owner’s reputation. 
However, most industry members choose to exclude the post-accident 
RL due to its qualitative nature and the subjectivity of its factors. The 
characteristics of factors affecting RL of a company are as follows: (1) 
time dependent (Dunbar and Schwalbach, 2000; Bie, 2006), (2) multi-
dimensional (Fombrun, 1996), (3) behaviour dependent (Bie, 2006), 
and (4) highly influenced by stakeholders’ past experience with the 
company’s services (Spence, 2011; Tanabe and Miyake, 2012; Ale et al., 
2017). To simplify the assessment procedure, the current practices for 
pipeline risk assessment assume that the cost of RL is equivalent to the 
business interruption costs (Muhlbauer, 2004; Silva and Lopes, 2018). 
Likewise, in previous studies, the loss of a company’s reputation is 
calculated based on fluctuations in the share price over a period of time 
(Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998; Money and Hillenbrand, 2006; Tonello, 
2007; Scandizzo, 2011; Villa et al., 2017). This method of quantifying RL 
is time dependent but affects only a single stakeholder, e.g., the investors 
of the company. Ironically, the expectations of the other stakeholders 
have similar impacts, i.e., jeopardizing the reputation of the company 
and significantly influencing company operations (Macnamara, 2006). 
Public perception prior to a pipeline damage event is crucial, as it forces 
pipeline operators to apply immediate mitigation measures. This public 
pressure insisting for a safe pipeline differs by geographical location and 
the status of the pipeline owner. 
Although efforts to quantify RL for pipeline owners has been initiated 
by previous research (E&P 6.54/246, 1996; Muhlbauer, 2004; PTG 
11.36.04, 2015), none of the available models rank the factors influ-
encing the company’s RL for reacting to the most severe factors from the 
perspectives of the various company’s stakeholders. Furthermore, a 
model to quantify RL specifically tailored for onshore pipeline damage is 
currently unavailable. However, there are existing models of RL found in 
other industries such as banking and retail (Muller and Vercouter, 2008; 
APCO Insight, 2010; Li et al., 2010; Cherchiello, 2011; He and Wu, 
2013). 
The prediction of pipeline COF in publications is scarcely available 
(De Cunha, 2016). If RL has a significant contribution to the total cost of 
a failure event and is commonly neglected in the monetary COF 
assessment, inaccurate assessment can occur due to the negligence. 
Additional cost may be imposed due to unnecessary inspections initiated 
by errors in pipeline inspections and maintenance. Hence, a pipeline 
company’s annual profit margins are affected. If a RLM is well devel-
oped, reasonable increments in the inspection frequency can prevent 
pipeline damage by focusing on the higher-risk pipelines. Since the RL 
factor is qualitative, it is difficult to quantify it in a monetary manner. 
Thus, an initiative to quantify RL from different perspectives of the 
pipeline operator’s stakeholders, e.g., investors, customers, employees 
and the public, is highly recommended. 
Thus, this study aims to evaluate the impact of RL on pipeline owners 
and is the subject of two companion papers. In this paper (Part 1), pri-
oritization of the reputation-threat factors according to different stake-
holders’ perspectives is presented. In the subsequent paper (Part 2), the 
stakeholder-oriented priority vectors for reputation-threat factors of 
pipeline damage are evaluated, including the prediction and validation 
of the model via interviews with experts and implementing case studies 
in Malaysia. The outcomes may contribute to the consequence assess-
ment of pipeline damage by exploring a selection of RL factors for 
pipeline owner’s RL modelling purposes in future. 
2. Literature review 
Pipelines are the safest means of transporting natural gas and haz-
ardous liquids according to the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) (Dziubínski et al., 2006; Carvalho et al., 2008; 
Brito and Almeida, 2009; Brito et al., 2010; Furchtgott-Roth, 2013). 
Pipelines are prone to failure due to third-party damage, corrosion, 
natural forces, and other causes. To maintain safety when transporting 
high-risk products such as O&G, implementation of PIMPs is crucial. A 
PIMP is a set of controls and activities related to pipeline design, oper-
ation, inspection, maintenance and assessment intended to minimize the 
risk of a pipeline failure to “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP). 
2.1. Pipeline Integrity Management Programmes (PIMP) 
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) launched 
a PIMP in the early 2000s to improve safety measures for old and new 
pipelines and reduce the impact of pipeline damage. The rules for gas 
transmission pipelines issued in late 2003 require operators to identify 
high consequence areas (HCA), identify threats within an HCA, priori-
tize segments based on the identified threats, replace or repair segments 
requiring remediation, reassess segments every seven years, and develop 
a written PIMP to improve pipeline safety (Feldman, 2015). Since these 
rules were enforced, the trend in increasing pipeline incidents between 
1994 and 2004 has plateaued (NTSB SS-15/01, 2015). To prioritize 
pipeline inspections, pipeline operators and owners must forecast the 
likelihood of a pipeline failure and its possible impact on internal and 
external stakeholders. This stage is known as pipeline risk assessment, 
and the measuring tool used to evaluate risk by assessing the probability 
and consequences of a pipeline failure to plan pipeline maintenance and 
inspections is known as an RBI. 
Pipeline risk assessment in the O&G industry has evolved over time 
due to the need for better PIMP to guarantee safe and reliable operations 
that are used as the basis for economic-friendly decisions (Paez and Roy, 
2010; Denis et al., 2013). It allows the documentation and categoriza-
tion of pipeline segments’ vulnerabilities to identify risks in an orga-
nized manner. It integrates various stages of reliability and consequence 
analysis for the purpose of answering the following questions (Muhl-
bauer, 2004): (1) What is the cause of a pipeline failure? (2) How can the 
failure occur? (3) How frequently does the failure occur? (4) What are 
the consequences of the failure? The efficiency of a pipeline risk 
assessment can be evaluated by its capability to characterize and 
calculate all pipeline-related risks (Sulaiman and Tan, 2014). A smart 
pipeline risk assessment uses common sense tactics to create a mean-
ingful, logical and structured approach that integrates all available in-
formation into a robust evaluation, permitting situation-specific 
solutions that are concise yet flexible (Muhlbauer, 2012). 
Risk assessment is currently a common practice in many industries; it 
permits the owner to prepare contingencies for any unwanted event that 
may occur in the future. It can be defined as the verification of the 
qualitative or quantitative risk value associated with a particular situ-
ation and an identified hazard or threat (Muhlbauer, 2004). It is per-
formed by compiling the estimated risks into a risk matrix in which the 
risks are evaluated by a specific number derived from estimates of the 
frequency or likelihood and severity or consequence. This matrix de-
scribes the levels of tolerable risks by a ranking procedure. The com-
pany’s tolerable risks are defined according to the ALARP region 
established by the company, so that the available options to mitigate the 
identified risks are cost and benefit friendly. 
The assessment of pipeline failure consequence includes the failure 
impact on humans, loss of company assets, environmental damage and 
RL. The risk of pipeline damage increases linearly with the impact 
severity rating (i.e., 1 – negligible to 5 – catastrophic). The current 
consequence assessments of pipeline losses track individual and com-
bined losses. A combined loss uses an index for the consequences of 
failure (PTG 11.36.04, 2015). For example, the business service 
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interruption costs are considered a loss of reputation for a pipeline 
owner due to difficulties in quantifying the reputation numerically 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). This is insufficient for portraying the actual losses to 
a pipeline owner’s reputation; the reputation is the belief of the com-
pany’s stakeholders towards an owner (Fombrun, 1996). A compre-
hensive consequence assessment model is needed to help operators 
forecast possible losses and plan an effective and cost-effective PIMP to 
secure the pipeline owners’ annual profit margins. 
2.2. Consequence assessment 
The assessment of the consequence of failure (COF), or simply the 
consequence assessment, involves the quantification of the likely dam-
age or loss as a result of any possible eventuality (Pula et al., 2005). The 
COF is assessed as the outcome of a failure based on an assumption that 
such a failure will occur. The consequences can be categorized into two 
types: short-term consequences (losses at the time of failure, e.g., the 
cost of hospitalization for employees and members of the public) and 
long-term consequences (future losses that occur in subsequent years, e. 
g., the costs of production losses and costs of environment treatment/-
decontamination) (Dziubínski et al., 2006). According to the Petronas 
Technical Standards (PTS) of Pipeline Operational Risk Assessment, the 
COF is defined for all consequences that are of importance to the pipe-
line operator, i.e., safety, economic, environmental and reputation (PTG 
11.36.04, 2015). 
Losses resulting from pipeline accidents cause a wide-ranging set of 
consequences. COFs are commonly assessed by measuring the people, 
environmental, and economic losses that will be borne by the asset 
owner (Brandsæter, 2002; Brito et al., 2010; DNV-RP-F107, 2010; Guo 
et al., 2018). The economic loss is considered the loss of the pipeline 
owners’ production and/or assets, depending on the term they prefer to 
use in their assessment. The level of measurable harm or damage is 
described in terms of a monetary value or number of fatalities (Muhl-
bauer, 2006). The monetary value is determined by the willingness to 
pay for every scenario of consequences (Jonkman et al., 2003; Park 
et al., 2004). The fatality rate is the preferred measure, as it is the most 
important, but other pipeline failure consequences require the same 
amount of attention (Jo and Jong, 2005; Brito and Almeida, 2009). 
The effects of human and environmental losses on the pipeline 
consequence analysis are an active field of research, as they directly 
affect the trust of the external stakeholders, which subsequently affects 
the owner’s credibility in pipeline integrity management (Khan and 
Haddara, 2004; Arunraj and Maiti, 2009; Han and Weng, 2011). The 
asset loss can be calculated by referring to the stored asset inventory 
database of the company. These three losses can be easily quantified, in 
numerical or monetary terms or as time-based disruptions. On the other 
hand, the reputation COF has yet to be measured by these means. 
Currently, RL is measured based on concerns broadcast on mass and/or 
electronic media or pressure from parties who have a personal or 
corporate interest in the company, from the lowest (local) to the highest 
level (international) (PTG 11.36.04, 2015). A company’s reputation is 
the belief of stakeholders towards a company and its attributes (Fom-
brun, 1996). This technical standard partially assesses the RL for a 
pipeline owner because it focuses primarily on the public impact; the 
investors, customers and employees are neglected. This qualitative 
assessment is a self-centred assessment; an assessor’s preferences vary 
depending on his/her experience in assessing the risk of pipeline dam-
age. In addition to reputation, other types of loss, e.g., people, assets, 
environmental and production, are assessed quantitatively. There is a 
need to express the reputation in a quantitative manner, or at least using 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative measurements, i.e., a 
semi-quantitative assessment, to simplify the assessment process. This 
process leads to inconsistencies in assessing the RL as part of a conse-
quence assessment, which affects the total risk value of the pipeline. A 
comprehensive PIMP is unsuccessfully executed if the RL impacts on a 
pipeline’s risk value are proven to be significant. 
In addition to PTG 11.36.04, other technical standards can be uti-
lized to assess the consequence of pipeline damage, such as the Integrity 
Management of Submarine Pipeline Systems recommended practices 
(DNV-RP-F116, 2015). According to Det Norske Veritas (DNV), the 
recommended practice of risk assessment of pipeline protection stan-
dard, the pipeline COF is assessed based on human safety, environ-
mental impact and economic loss (DNV-RP- F107, 2010; DNV-RP-F116, 
2015). However, another recent DNV standard for the verification of 
onshore pipelines suggests that an additional impact of loss be measured 
in addition to those suggested in the previous standards, i.e., regulatory 
and political consequences (DNV-DSS-316, 2013). 
PTG 11.36.04 (2015) determined RL by the summation of three main 
losses, namely, human, economic and environment. DNV-RP-F116 
(2015) suggests that company reputation can be considered by types 
of impact in the COF assessment. In addition to political consequences 
and loss of share value, reputation is considered one of the elements that 
damages the environment (DNV-RP-F116, 2015). Thus, loss of company 
reputation is included in the environmental impact assessment. In 
contrast, in the American Petroleum Institutes (API) Risk-Based In-
spection recommended practice, loss of reputation is assumed to be the 
loss of market share (API-RP-580, 2009). These three different standards 
have their own ways to assess the impact of RL; hence, different results 
are obtained. The pipeline operator may use any standard that suits the 
company objective as long as the pipeline can be operated safely. 
2.3. Loss categories 
Hokstad and Steiro (2006) introduce 11 categories of overall losses 
for vulnerability management. The first nine losses are combined and 
categorized into four major losses, including production loss, asset loss, 
human health and safety loss, and environmental loss, to create an in-
dividual or overall consequence model (Khan and Haddara, 2003; 
Arunraj and Maiti, 2009; Hanafiah et al., 2015). This directly calculated 
loss is also called the tangible assets loss. An effort to quantify the RL is 
required because earning a reputation is more difficult and takes longer 
than losing it and it is one of the indicators of a company’s long-term 
success. Referring to the loss costing guidelines for O&G exploration 
and production, the quantification of an O&G company’s RL is simply 
not impossible (E&P 6.54/246, 1996). 
2.4. Identifying factors from various databases 
The media reports of pipeline failures, such as the pipeline explosions 
in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Andhra Pradesh in India, and Sarawak, Malaysia, 
in 2014, have been common in recent years. The impact from a pipeline 
accident is tremendously horrible, particularly when numerous fatalities 
and injuries are involved, and immediate coverage in the mass or elec-
tronic media is unavoidable. In general, these reports generate different 
perceptions among the stakeholders; negative impressions are obviously 
expected. These perceptions may directly or indirectly degrade the 
company’s reputation. 
The RL factor cannot be identified from any currently available on-
line pipeline accident event databases for public reference because these 
databases commonly record only the cause of the accident and the 
quantifiable losses, i.e., human, environmental, and asset. Furthermore, 
the accident documentation method, types of recorded historical data, 
and the definition of the accident vary among countries. Three different 
bodies of pipeline safety are used as examples, including the European 
Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), the Transportation Safety 
Board (TSB) of Canada, and the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) of the United States Department of Trans-
portation (USDOT). These three regulatory bodies have recorded pipe-
line accident events since the 1970s. 
The EGIG was established in 1982 by European gas transmission 
system operators as an initiative to record unintentional gas releases 
from their pipelines, aimed at providing pipeline safety performance 
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assessments for the purpose of forecasting incident frequencies and 
probabilities (EGIG, 2014). Its database covers incidents for the years 
between 1970 and 2013, involves 17 operators, and records incidents 
that meet the following conditions: an unintentional gas release inci-
dent; the pipeline must be made of steel with a maximum operating 
pressure greater than 15 bar; and the pipeline must be located onshore 
but outside of gas installation fences (EGIG, 2014). Production lines, 
equipment or component-related incidents are not included in the 
database. 
The TSB has been responsible for providing an annual summary of 
pipeline safety data since 1970, stating that “the types of facilities involved 
in accidents and incidents such as compressor station, gathering line, injection 
or delivery facility, meter station, gas processing plant, pump station, storage 
facility, terminal, transmission line and others” (TSB, 2014). The report 
offers a statistical summary of accidents and incidents by different 
analysis categories (TSB, 2014), including type, province, facility type, 
product type and quantity released. 
The PHMSA has recorded all reported incidents related to pipelines 
in the country since 1970 and provides a statistical summary with trend 
lines for the previous 20 years of pipeline incidents; they are categorized 
into the two groups of significant and serious incidents (PHMSA, 2015). 
The PHMSA database consists of recorded incidents pertaining to 
onshore and offshore pipelines in various types of systems as such gas 
transmission, gas distribution, gas gathering, liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
and hazardous liquid (PHMSA, 2015). The raw data concerning a 
pipeline incident can be retrieved from PHMSA and the United State 
Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety as well. 
These three regulatory bodies have introduced different definitions 
of pipeline accidents. EGIG (2014) defines an incident simply as any 
unintentional gas release from a transmission pipeline. However, the 
TSB and PHMSA each divide pipeline accidents into two groups, inci-
dent and accident and significant incident and serious incident, 
respectively. For example, TSB (2014) mentioned that it is considered “a 
commodity pipeline incident if any of these conditions are fulfilled: an 
uncontained and uncontrolled release of a commodity occurs; a pipeline is 
operated beyond its design limits; a pipeline causes obstruction to vehicles as a 
result of a supporting environment disturbance; the structural integrity of the 
pipeline reduces under its design limits by any abnormality; any local activity 
near the pipeline poses a threat to the pipeline structural integrity; any part of 
the pipeline has a shutdown due to a hazard to secure commodity trans-
portation”. In contrast, a commodity pipeline accident is “a direct effect 
from a commodity pipeline operation, where a person is exposed to fire, 
ignition, explosion or release that causes fatality or serious injury necessi-
tating hospitalization; the commodity pipeline withstands damage due to 
contact with another object or supporting environment disturbance, or sus-
tains an explosion, or a fire or ignition that is not associated with normal 
operating circumstances, or endures damage resulting in the release of any 
commodity”. 
According to PHMSA (2015), “an incident is considered significant if 
any of the following occur: fatality; personal injury requiring hospitalization; 
property damage, including clean-up costs, the value of lost product, and the 
damage to the property of the operator or others, or both, estimated to exceed 
$50,000; release of five gallons or more of a highly volatile and hazardous 
liquid (any petroleum or petroleum product) or carbon dioxide; and an ex-
plosion or fire not intentionally set by the operator”. An incident that meets 
the first two criteria is considered a serious incident (PHMSA, 2015). 
The differences in these definitions of a pipeline accident are due to 
different regulations imposed by each country. It is vital for a govern-
ment to provide a safe and sound living environment for citizens; public 
safety is a government priority. 
Fig. 1 shows the annual number of incidents between 1970 and 2013 
based on EGIG reports. The incident data between 2004 and 2013 was 
extracted from the TSB and PHMSA database reports, as shown in Figs. 2 
and 3. To obtain the number of similar cases within a selected time 
frame, the onshore natural gas transmission pipeline cases from between 
2004 and 2013 recorded in all of the abovementioned databases are 
observed. The total numbers of cases reported within the 10-year in all 
databases are as follows: 209 incidents are reported by the EGIG (EGIG, 
2014); the TSB reported 233 cases, of which 19 are considered accidents, 
while the remaining cases are categorized as incidents (TSB, 2014); and 
606 cases are documented by the PHMSA, of which 43 are serious in-
cidents and the others are significant incidents (PHMSA, 2015). 
A total of 1048 gas transmission pipeline cases are reported in the 
selected databases within a ten-year period (between 2004 and 2013) in 
Europe, Canada and the US. There are other countries that may also 
have similar databases; an interested party can purchase them in a 
customer-centred customized format (EGIG, 2014). The number of cases 
increases as there is a possibility for any natural and hazardous liquid 
pipeline to experience failure at any location and time, either docu-
mented or ignored, depending on the regulations of its respective 
country, specifically for an onshore pipeline (PHMSA, 2015). 
The lives of innocent people are in danger, and in recent years, the 
Fig. 1. Annual number of incidents (1970–2013) (Source: EGIG, 2014).  
L. Zardasti et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 63 (2020) 104034
5
demands for safety precautions have become greater. This urges pipeline 
owners to evaluate their pipelines’ reliability to compensate for the trust 
from the stakeholders. The reason behind the reduction in the number of 
gas transmission pipeline incidents in the last 20 years shown in Fig. 1 is 
not found in the database (EGIG, 2014). In addition, the documentation 
of pipeline damage from each database rarely reports the analysis of the 
COF of the events. Even if available, only tangible monetary-based los-
ses, e.g., number of injuries and fatalities, cost of assets, and production 
losses, are included. 
Of all the database records on the frequency of pipeline failure events 
and causes of failure mentioned, only the PHMSA provides statistics for 
the consequence analysis of the number of fatalities, injury costs, in-
dustry costs and public loss. The TSB and PHMSA were established by 
the Canadian and US governments, respectively, while the EGIG was 
developed by the 17 major operators of gas transmission in Europe. 
Their records for pipeline systems differ; the EGIG reports unintentional 
natural gas releases from transmission pipelines, the TSB records failure 
events in federally regulated pipelines, and the PHMSA records all 
pipeline damage in the US. Zardasti et al. (2017) successfully identified 
30 RL factors indicating stakeholders’ negative perceptions based on an 
in-depth review of 30 case studies of pipeline failure during the period 
between 1965 and 2014. However, the prioritization of these multiple 
factors is an issue that has been raised for future research. 
2.5. Prioritization of reputation loss (RL) factors 
Identifying RL factors is pointless unless they are prioritized. Many 
factors have been identified; it is fruitless to focus on all factors at once. 
Moreover, it is an ineffective way to overcome the loss of reputation 
practically, specifically for a pipeline operator. Thus, there is a need to 
prioritize the identified RL indicators to assist pipeline operators or 
owners in focusing on which factor is to be addressed first. There are 
several factor prioritization techniques available. The analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) are appro-
priate methods to prioritize factors because they segregate the weighting 
of each factor based on respondents’ preferences. In addition, these 
methods have successfully interpreted respondents’ preferences and 
transform a linguistic rating scale into a numerical fuzzy scale. This al-
lows the result of a RLM to be designed quantitatively. 
The AHP method was developed by Thomas L. Saaty in 1980 (Kiris, 
2013). It is an effective tool to solve complex decision making by 
allowing respondents to prioritize the importance levels of factors (Torfi 
et al., 2010; Nilashi and Janahmadi, 2012; Hossain et al., 2014). A 
higher weight factor is an indication of a highly important factor, and 
vice versa. In a general framework of the AHP method, Criterion and 
Sub-Criterion are the factors identified to achieve the Goal, while Alter-
native is the choice of solutions available corresponding to the Goal. AHP 
consists of four steps (Coulter et al., 2006): (1) the hierarchical break-
down of a problem into a Goal, Criterion, and Sub-Criterion, (2) the 
practice of a pairwise comparison procedure to define respondents’ 
preferences, (3) the scaling of the attribute values for each alternative, 
and (4) the alternative ranking. The root of the AHP method is the 
determination of the relative importance of the Criteria and Sub-Criterion 
to rank the Alternatives via the pairwise comparison method (Arunraj 
and Maiti, 2010). The pairwise comparison is challenging when n(n-1)/2 
pairwise comparisons must be completed, where n is the number of 
predetermined criteria. Moreover, respondents can easily become bored 
during a survey questionnaire session, regardless of the questionnaire 
design (Sato, 2005). This issue can be overcome by implementing the 
pair-wise judgement data transformation process (Chen, 2010). 
In addition to solving the subjective qualitative attributes, AHP is 
applicable to make objective judgements from the quantitative attri-
butes or a mixture of both. It is one of the best ways for deciding among 
complex criteria structures on different levels (Ozdagoglu and 
Ozdagoglu, 2007). However, Yang and Chen described the limitations of 
a pure AHP method (Toosi and Kohanali, 2011): (1) it is mainly used in 
the applications of nearly crisp-information decisions, (2) it generates 
uneven judgement scales and excludes uncertainties in human judge-
ment, (3) it produces inaccurate rankings, and (4) AHP output is 
significantly influenced by the perceptions and other subjective judge-
ments based on decision makers’ preferences. 
Fuzzy logic was primarily introduced by Lotfi Asker Zadeh in 1965 
(Zadeh, 2008). It is an attempt to formalize two types of human capa-
bilities: (1) to converse reason and make rational decisions in imperfect 
information environments, and (2) to perform various physical and 
mental tasks without any measurements or computations (Zadeh, 2008). 
The FAHP is a synthetic extension of the classical AHP method in which 
the fuzziness of the decision makers is considered (Ozdagoglu and 
Ozdagoglu, 2007; Kabir and Hasin, 2011). Several researchers have in-
tegrated fuzzy theory with the AHP method to eliminate the uncertainty 
and vagueness in the judgement of the decision makers (Aydin and 
Fig. 2. Annual number of accidents and incidents in TSB (2004–2013) (Source: TSB, 2014).  
Fig. 3. Annual number of serious and significant incidents in PHMSA 
(2004–2013) (Source: PHMSA, 2015). 
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Pakdil, 2008; Chuang et al., 2009; Li and Poh, 2010; Toosi and Kohanali, 
2011; Javanbarg et al., 2012; Pandey et al., 2013; Aqlan and Ali, 2014; 
Sa’idi et al., 2014; Urbina and Aoyama, 2017). FAHP was applied to 
determine the relative weights of the criteria (Chuang et al., 2009; Torfi 
et al., 2010; Li and Poh, 2010; Amini and Jochem, 2011; Zeynali et al., 
2012; Noor et al., 2012; Pandey et al., 2013). This helps in prioritizing 
the factors and attributes of the predetermined factors (Mikhailov and 
Tsvetinov, 2004; Kong and Liu, 2005; Bozbura and Beskese, 2007; Sevkli 
et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2009; Junior et al., 2014) and ranking the 
available choices to achieve an objective (Celik et al., 2009; Das, 2010; 
Dalalah et al., 2010; Gharakhani et al., 2014). Both the AHP and FAHP 
methods are able to derive the resulting weights of the predetermined 
factors. Hence, the identification of the comparison between weights in 
both methods is necessary (Ozdagoglu and Ozdagoglu, 2007; Kordi, 
2008; Kabir and Hasin, 2011). 
2.6. Remarks 
The literature search presented explained the need to develop a RLM 
for onshore pipeline failure involving an explosion. Previous explosion 
events show that the pipeline owner’s reputation was jeopardized due to 
the impact of the accident on their stakeholders, which justifies that the 
stakeholders’ expectations were unable to be achieved. Hence, the 
pipeline owner suffers RL. The reputation of a company is relative to the 
stakeholders’ expectations, and it differs depending on their concerns 
with respect to a company. Therefore, to develop a quantitative RLM of a 
Fig. 4. Hierarchical breakdown of proposed RLM framework.  
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pipeline owner prior to an explosion event, the identification of 30 RL 
indicators of onshore pipeline damage reported in the past 50 years 
(between 1965 and 2014) was accomplished using an event study 
method for 30 case studies (Zardasti et al., 2017). These multiple factors 
are troublesome without being prioritized to allow the owner to respond 
to the factors that show a higher impact. The currently available repu-
tation models assess the reputation level of a company based on a single 
stakeholder or a combination of several stakeholders. 
3. Methodology 
The AHP and FAHP were utilized to weight the RL factors and 
determine the relationship between the identified factors and the pipe-
line operators’ RL prior to the event. Statistical analysis was imple-
mented for the verification of the data hypotheses. The evaluation of the 
RL impact was performed by the establishment of a reputation loss index 
(RLI) incorporating the RL severity rating, which was built into the risk 
matrix to assess the consequences of pipeline failure; simultaneously, 
the risk value is obtained. The RLI of the selected pipeline explosion 
events discussed in Zardasti et al. (2017) is obtained as part of the 
evaluation process. Finally, a RLM to assess the pipeline consequence 
failure following an explosion is developed quantitatively. 
3.1. Framework of the reputation loss model (RLM) 
Based on the identified RL factors obtained from Zardasti et al. 
(2017), the factors were arranged into a proposed RLM framework as 
shown in Fig. 4. This arrangement was inspired by the work of Cravens 
et al. (2003), and in the later analysis work, the AHP method will be used 
for factor prioritization purposes. Since the identification of the RL 
factors is highly dependent on the stakeholders’ perceptions, the iden-
tified factors were arranged according to the impact to a specific 
stakeholder. For example, the RL factors “Share price dropped and 
market capitalization affected”, “Services interrupted hence sales re-
duces”, “Downgraded owner’s ranking by ranking agencies”, “Reduced 
credit rating by rating agencies”, “Loss contracts to operate new pipe-
line”, and “Loss sponsorship opportunity” are factors that may influence 
the trust of the investors towards the company. Thus, these factors are 
sub-factors for the pipeline operator’s stakeholder “Investor”. This 
arrangement was created for “Customer”, “Employee” and “Public” as 
well. 
Since most of the factors have quite long names, they were given 
codes for simplicity by implementing the AHP hierarchical breakdown, 
as shown in Fig. 4, indicating that the stakeholders “Investor”, 
“Customer”, “Employee” and “Public” are criterion coded as A, B, C, and 
D, respectively; the Sub-criterion are the RL factors coded as A1, A2, A3, 
A4, A5, and A6 for each factor under stakeholder “Investor”. The sub- 
subcriteria “Multiple fatality and injuries”, “Fire extinguished over 
longer duration”, “Destroyed private properties”, and “Damaged vast 
environment area” are under the sub-criterion “Accident severity” coded 
as D3 under the stakeholder “Public”, and thus they were coded as D31, 
D32, D33, and D34, respectively. 
To support the findings, experts were interviewed, and the relative 
importance of RL factors was identified. The identified factors are 
designed as questionnaires to undergo a preliminary survey to obtain 
responses from respondents regarding their feasibility and understand-
ing, including the questionnaire’s layout and design. 
3.2. Interviews 
Several interview sessions were completed to obtain expert opinions 
regarding the identification of the RL factors and the feasibility of the 
RLM. Initially, ten O&G pipeline integrity management employees were 
selected to participate in each interview session, which had different 
objectives: agreements on the RL factors and questionnaire validation. 
The experts involved in the interviews were selected from different 
sectors of O&G companies with headquarters in Malaysia, such as 
private-limited petroleum exploration and production companies, 
pipeline technical solution providers and publicly listed gas trans-
mission pipeline companies. These local companies were selected 
because they have a better understanding of the local conditions of 
pipeline damage failure probabilities and consequences. The majority of 
the experts have a minimum of five years of working experience in 
pipeline integrity management in an O&G company. 
The first session was conducted to gain the experts’ agreement on the 
identified factors of RL collected through literature reviews and case 
studies. The overall idea of the research was presented prior to the 
interview to provide an overview and scope of the work to be executed. 
The interview sessions were performed individually to allow direct two- 
way conversations and reduce misinterpretations and misconceptions of 
the factors. This allowed no bias between experts’ points of view against 
each identified factor. From the interview sessions, all experts agreed 
with all identified factors, and several suggestions were raised for 
consideration, such as the following: pipeline location, e.g., onshore 
pipelines, must be stated so that the RL factors will be directly interre-
lated; the term “responsibility” is sensitive to O&G companies as the 
industry is a well-known high-risk industry, and responsibility is their 
main focus to deliver a safe and sound project for a good reputation; and 
the factors associated with employees’ attitudes are important as each 
employee is both an internal stakeholder and an agent of the company’s 
first impression towards the external stakeholders. 
The next interview sessions aimed to validate the constructed survey 
to satisfy the minimum requirements of O&G industry members. A trial 
questionnaire survey was distributed and answered during the interview 
sessions. This hands-on session was held with all experts simultaneously 
at each of their companies, and they were allowed to ask any questions 
regarding the survey at the midpoint of the session so that their un-
derstanding of the questions could be observed. At the end of the ses-
sions, several suggestions were made to improve the questionnaire from 
the experts’ perspectives as employees of O&G companies, including the 
following: the rating scale of 1–10 is considered a large range, and 
people in the industry are easily confused, so it is best to use a 1 to 5 
rating scale; a given scenario of a pipeline explosion event that includes 
the failure cause and impact is the best way to avoid too much writing in 
the questionnaire survey, as words simply bore participants faster than 
figures; and a short and concise questionnaire survey is better as a 
shorter duration is needed to complete the survey. These suggestions 
were taken into consideration in the construction of the preliminary and 
subsequent questionnaires. 
3.3. Questionnaire and survey 
In addition to collecting data via the literature review, case studies 
and interviews with experts, a questionnaire is another instrument 
applied in this study. Based on the data collected and suggestions noted 
from the previous research instruments, the questionnaire was con-
structed to obtain responses from particular experts of this study. Two 
surveys were conducted: (1) a preliminary survey and (2) a main survey. 
These surveys were intended to obtain the perception on the RL factor 
from the panel of experts, both pipeline integrity management em-
ployees and researchers, with several purposes: (1) the level of influ-
ence, (2) the level of importance, and (3) the impact of the factors 
towards each stakeholder, i.e., investors, customers, employees and the 
public. Subsequently, each stakeholder was asked to provide their re-
sponses regarding the influence of the RL factors towards pipeline 
owners in a different questionnaire. As a general rule for most research, 
a sample size of more than 30 but less than 500 is considered appro-
priate, as suggested by J.T. Roscoe (Kumar et al., 2013). Depending on 
the method of analysis to be used, the number of respondents may differ. 
For example, the AHP and FAHP methods require at least ten re-
spondents due to the complexity of the analysis, and the number of re-
spondents is considered satisfactory for further analysis. 
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For the preliminary survey, ten people were considered adequate to 
answer the survey regardless of their knowledge background. A research 
student is a good example of a respondent for this preliminary study, 
incorporated with several pipeline integrity management experts with at 
least five years of pipeline integrity management working experience. 
This survey was done to test the reliability of the data obtained from the 
returned survey. The Cronbach’s alpha for this survey should be at least 
0.70 for a new construct to show that the internal consistency of the 
questionnaire is above an acceptable level, and consequently further 
analysis of the survey can be executed. The preliminary questionnaire 
was prepared to obtain responses from the respondents regarding the 
suitability of the questionnaire layout, including the instructions and 
questions, understanding of the questions, and answer methods. This 
stage allows the respondents to suggest any improvements to be made to 
minimize the level of misunderstanding of respondents to the main 
questionnaire later. 
There are two types of preliminary questionnaire designs in this 
study, Type 1 and Type 2. The preliminary survey, Type 1, was designed 
to identify the factors that influence the O&G pipeline operator’s loss of 
reputation due to a pipeline explosion event. This survey was handed to 
the selected respondents in person and retrieved immediately once it 
was completed (within 10 min). However, to create a respondent- 
friendly questionnaire survey, an online survey is the latest and easiest 
method to gain respondent interest to complete a survey with good in-
structions laid out in the survey design. There is a significant amount of 
current research that implements this method with the help of online 
forms due to its simplicity for data collection. The responses from the 
respondents were later automatically recorded once the submit button 
was clicked. The Type 1 survey designed previously was corrected and 
upgraded into an online version with several modifications. The pre-
liminary survey Type 2 design aimed to gain the perceptions of the 
stakeholders (investors, customers, employees and the public) towards a 
pipeline operator who was involved in an onshore pipeline accident 
related to an explosion. 
The main surveys were designed online based on the lessons learned 
from the preliminary survey. For this study, there are five types of sur-
veys with different objectives to be achieved: Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, 
Type 4 and Type 5. These surveys were distributed via electronic mail 
and shared on social media related to the O&G company stakeholders in 
Malaysia, as follows: (1) Type 1 surveys all stakeholders, (2) Type 2 for 
investors, (3) Type 3 for customers, (4) Type 4 for employees, and (5) 
Type 5 for the public. The objective of the Type 1 main survey was to 
evaluate the perceptions of the stakeholders towards a pipeline operator 
after an onshore pipeline accident related to an explosion. The Type 2 
main survey design was expanded from the main questionnaire design of 
the Type 1 version. This survey was intended to allow an investor to 
assess the RL level of a pipeline company according to the RL indicators 
provided, accompanied with a structured worst-case scenario for 
assessment purposes. Meanwhile, the Type 3, Type 4 and Type 5 main 
survey formats and objectives were somewhat similar to the Type 2 main 
survey design and were used to obtain responses from customers, em-
ployees and the public, respectively. 
3.4. Data analysis 
Prior to modelling the O&G pipeline company RL specifically 
designed for pipeline consequence assessment, the collected data from 
the literature review, case studies, interviews with experts and ques-
tionnaire surveys were analysed using a relevant and appropriate 
method to answer all the objectives at the end of the study. Initially, the 
number of factors extracted from the literature review, case studies and 
interviews with experts was calculated using frequency analysis, 
including the number of factors that occurred in each case study. As soon 
as the sample size was determined, the main survey was distributed to 
the respondents online. The data obtained from the designed pre-
liminary survey had to be subjected to a reliability analysis before the 
main survey could be distributed to the identified respondents. The 
reliability of the survey data was analysed using the computer-aided 
statistical analysis software known as Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS), and the data sampling for each survey was analysed by 
frequency analysis and percentages. It is crucial to perform hypothesis 
testing to determine the significant differences between samples to 
confirm that the samples are not different in terms of ratings before 
further analysis can be executed. The Mann-Whitney U test and the 
Kruskal-Wallis H test were utilized for this purpose due to the non- 
parametric nature of the survey data. 
To determine the relationship between the identified factors and the 
exploded pipeline owner’s reputation, the prioritization of the factors 
was analysed using the AHP and FAHP methods, and then the factors 
were ranked by rearranging the factor weights in a descending manner 
(i.e., highest weight ranked first). The factor priorities were also ranked 
according to the respective stakeholders’ perceptions to observe the 
impact level of each factor on the stakeholders. 
3.5. Statistical analysis 
Through the literature review, case studies and interviews with ex-
perts, the number of RL factors initiated by an event of an onshore O&G 
pipeline was retrieved (Zardasti et al., 2017). The number of factors that 
occurred in each selected case study was calculated using frequency 
analysis and was presented in a table. The number of factors that 
occurred in all case studies was also included in the table. The frequency 
of an observation is the number of times the observation occurs in the 
data. Frequency analysis measures the central tendency of the data and 
its dispersion, which is portrayed in tables or graphs. This analysis is 
used for all types of surveys and consists of multiple choice and ordinal 
questions. The responses were analysed by the numbers of frequency or 
percentages using Microsoft (MS) Excel and SPSS software; the highest 
value shows the most preferred answer among the respondents. The 
calculation of frequency percentage is shown in Equation (1). 
Percentage% f
N
 100 (1)  
where f is the frequency of an observation and N is the number of 
respondents. 
Generally, a sample size for research activities can be determined by 
Equation (2) (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970). 
SS
X2NP1   P
d2N   1  X2P1   P (2)  
where SS is the required sample size; X2 is the table value of Chi-square 
for 1-degree of freedom at the desired confidence level; N is the popu-
lation size; P is the population proportion (assumed to be 0.50 since this 
would provide the maximum sample size); and d is the degree of accu-
racy expressed as a proportion (0.05). A population is an entire group of 
people, while a sample is a portion that represents the population. For an 
unknown and outnumbered population, as a general rule, a sample size 
of 30 respondents is needed, as well as for a sample that is broken into 
sub-samples, e.g., by race or gender, as proposed by J.T. Roscoe in 1975 
(Kumar et al., 2013). For the return rate of the questionnaire, an indi-
cation of adequacy is used. This statement of adequacy justifies that the 
questionnaire is acceptable to be further analysed for documentation 
purposes (Miller, 1991). 
Information on perceptions and opinions normally involves Likert- 
scaled questions, as the qualitative data are unable to be measured 
directly; this assessment of attitude was introduced by Rensis Likert in 
1931 (Gliem and Gliem, 2003). It is necessary to calculate and report the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for determining the internal consistency 
reliability when a Likert scale is used (Brown, 2011). The Cronbach’s 
alpha reliability coefficient ranges between 0 and 1 (Gliem and Gliem, 
2003); the internal consistency of the scale increases as the value is 
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closer to 1. The reliability analysis was done on all preliminary and main 
surveys to obtain the internal consistency so that it achieves a Cron-
bach’s alpha reliability coefficient of at least 0.70 and the internal 
consistency is acceptable. 
A Likert-scale survey must be analysed as ordinal data instead of 
intervals, although the difference between scales is somewhat similar to 
that of interval data. Ordinal data are generally used for categorical 
data. These ordinal-scaled data are called non-metric data (Kumar et al., 
2013). The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test that is suitable 
to be used for this type of data, where the significance of the difference 
between two groups is to be observed. The Mann-Whitney U test, which 
is also known as the Wilcoxon rank sum test, was used to determine the 
significant difference between samples in terms of the ratings given in all 
surveys. It is crucial to perform this hypothesis testing to investigate 
differences among the respondents regarding the factors before a RLM 
can be developed. It tests the significant differences of the ratings of the 
RL factors between two independent groups of samples, such as the level 
of education, years of work experience, and type of stakeholder. 
This study indicated that the null hypothesis should not be rejected, 
which means that the ratings do not differ between groups. The test 
statistics can be determined by the sum of the ranks for each of the two 
groups. The significance of the ranks’ sums can be obtained by trans-
forming the score to a standard normal deviate value, Z. The significance 
level for this study was established to be 0.05, for which the level of 
confidence of 95% was selected. If the value of significance is greater 
than 0.05, the test does not reject the null hypothesis, which means there 
is no significant difference between the two groups of samples in terms 
of rating the RL factors. 
On the other hand, the Kruskal-Wallis H test is another non- 
parametric test for non-metric data. The difference between these two 
tests is the number of groups of samples to be tested for the significance 
of their differences. This test is implemented on a sample with more than 
two groups, denoted as K. The sum of the ranking can be performed by 
summing the ranks for each of the K groups. The Kruskal-Wallis H sta-
tistic is computed from these sums, and it has a distribution similar to a 
chi-square distribution. Briefly, the critical value of H can be determined 
from a chi-square distribution table. As the level of confidence of 95% 
was selected and the significance level for this study was established to 
be 0.05, the test does not reject the null hypothesis if the value of sig-
nificance is greater than 0.05. In conclusion, there is no significant dif-
ference between K groups of samples in terms of rating the RL factors. 
3.6. Prioritization of reputation loss (RL) factors 
Initially, all the criteria presented in Fig. 4 were included in the 
survey to obtain the respondents’ preferences according to the funda-
mental scale of the AHP method. The retrieved survey responses then 
underwent a procedure called the pairwise comparison method with the 
aid of the Super Decisions software. This method is used to obtain the 
relative weight of each criterion. However, the logical grouping of the 
nodes and clustering of the RL factor framework must be decided first, 
because each criterion has a local and global priority, whereby each 
level of criteria was scored with respect to its parent criterion by 
comparing one choice to another. As shown in Fig. 5, the clusters are 
made for factors under the parent criteria of the Goal, the Criterion and 
the Sub-criterion, e.g., factors A, B, C, and D, and the Sub-subcriterion, 
such as factor D3. The nodes are located within the clusters. This process 
was used to obtain the normalized weight for each factor, and subse-
quently the priority of each factor for the parent criterion and the 
criteria within the cluster can be obtained. The sum of all the criteria 
under a given parent criterion in each layer of the hierarchy must be 
equal to 1. 
Data from the surveys were input into the Super Decisions software 
prior to the completion of a manual calculation on the data trans-
formation scheme for the pairwise judgement suggested by Chen (2010), 
which overcomes the complexity in the analysis as the number of 
Fig. 5. AHP framework in the Super Decisions’ main window.  
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variables increases and the number of survey questions simultaneously 
decreases. The Pairwise Comparison command is available in the drop-
down menu of the Assess/Compare tab in the software. A popup window 
appears, and data entry can be performed. In the same window, the 
inconsistency, which is limited to 10% or 0.10 to validate the incon-
sistency of the rating by the respondent, is provided in the top right 
corner of the window. Similarly, the priorities of the factors are available 
just below the inconsistency value in the form of graphs and numbers. 
The overall priorities for all factors can be observed via the Computation 
tab dropdown menu of the Priorities command. 
The results given by the Super Decisions software can be obtained 
using the MS Excel software as well. The comparison between both 
factors was done to validate the results provided by the Super Decisions 
software. Hypothesis testing between the results is implemented to 
obtain the significant differences between both factors using non- 
parametric testing, e.g., the Mann-Whitney U test or the Kruskal- 
Wallis H test. The data retrieved from the Likert-scale survey are 
entered into a worksheet in MS Excel, and the calculation of the priority 
for each factor is performed. The pairwise comparisons are applied to 
factors within the same level in the AHP framework, namely, Criterion, 
Sub-criterion and Sub-subcriterion. Among all of the FAHP methods, the 
Chang’s extent analysis method is considered the simplest. This method 
is similar to previous methods; the difference is in the scale used (Lee 
et al., 2009). FAHP uses a triangular fuzzy scale (TFN) defined based on 
the AHP fundamental scale. The procedures to prioritize the RL are 
similar to those presented in Libriati et al. (2018). 
4. Results 
4.1. Statistical analysis 
The Cronbach’s alpha value for all questionnaires ranges between 
0.886 and 0.958, with a good to excellent reliability level, showing that 
the questionnaire design successfully achieves the minimum internal 
consistency value of 0.70 prior to collecting the responses as primary 
data. The return rates for the Type 1 and Type 5 surveys are adequate at 
91% and 50%, respectively, in contrast with the other surveys, due to 
several reasons. The Type 2 survey was distributed to investors despite 
the short research duration. A minimum of 30 respondents were con-
tacted, but only two responded, leading to a 6.7% return rate. 
Nevertheless, the responses were recorded to gain the differences in 
perspective between stakeholders. For the Type 3 and 4 surveys, the 
return rate was slightly below the minimum 50% return rate, 47% for 
both surveys, yet they met the minimum sample size of 30 persons. It is a 
general rule that surveys can be divided into sub-samples. Hence, all of 
the main surveys can be further analysed statistically. Table 1 shows a 
summary of the demographic analysis of all respondents calculated in 
terms of the frequency and percentages. 
Prior to determining the relationship between the factors of RL and 
their impact on an operator, hypothesis testing needs to be executed to 
avoid significant differences between the ratings of factors by the 
different groups of stakeholders. For example, there are two groups of 
customers, such as retailers and end users, involved in this analysis. It is 
hypothesized that there is no significant difference in the RL factors’ 
ratings between retailers and end users, for which the significance 
levels, p, for all factors must be more than 0.05 so that the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected. If so, it shows that there is a 5% chance that 
the results falling in the critical region have occurred by chance. 
Initially, the hypothesis testing was applied to different types of 
customers, customer awareness of pipeline accidents, years the product 
has been purchased by the customers, and customers’ current product 
brand used. The result shows that the null hypothesis is not rejected 
based on the p-value, except for the following factors: A, C, A2, A4, D3, 
and D32. Similarly, the significance of the difference of employees’ 
years of work experience, employees’ level of job position (level of 
management) and sector of O&G company were tested. The factors C, 
A2, C1, and C9 reject the null hypothesis, while the others accept it. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis tests are applied on the public factors 
concerning the awareness of pipeline accidents, highest level of educa-
tion, product purchase history, and current product brand use, and only 
factors B1 and B2 obtained less than a 0.05 p-value. Thus, it can be 
Table 1 
Respondents’ demographics for all main surveys.  
Type of Main Survey Criteria Category Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
1 (All stakeholders) 
Objective: To gain 
the perceptions of 
the stakeholders 
towards a pipeline 
operator after an 
onshore pipeline 
accident related to 
an explosion 
Gender Male 37 60.7 
Female 24 39.3 
Age (years) 21–30 37 60.7 
31–40 20 32.8 
41–50 3 4.90 




Yes 59 96.8 
No 2 3.20 
Type of 
stakeholder 
Investor 2 3.30 
Customer 8 13.1 
Employee 31 50.8 
Public 20 32.8 
2 (Investor) 
Objective: To allow 
the investor to 
assess the 
reputation loss level 
of the oil and gas 
company according 
to the reputation 
loss indicators 
provided 
Gender Male 2 100 
Female 0 0.0 
Age (years) 21–30 1 50.0 
31–40 1 50.0 
41–50 0 0.0 




Yes 2 100 
No 0 0.0 
3 (Customer) 
Objective: To allow 
the customer to 
assess the 
reputation loss level 
of the oil and gas 
company according 
to the reputation 
loss indicators 
provided 
Gender Male 2 100 
Female 0 0.0 
Age (years) 21–30 1 50.0 
31–40 1 50.0 
41–50 0 0.0 




Yes 2 100 
No 0 0.0 
4 (Employee) 
Objective: To allow 
the employee to 
assess the 
reputation loss level 
of the oil and gas 
company according 
to the reputation 
loss indicators 
provided 
Gender Male 17 73.9 
Female 6 26.1 
Age (years) 20–29 7 30.4 
30–39 9 39.1 
40–49 6 26.1 




Yes 23 100 




<5 9 39.1 
5–10 3 13.0 
>10 11 47.8 
Job position Executive 5 21.7 
Manager 5 21.7 
Engineer 12 52.2 
Others 1 4.30 
Company 
sector 




Fabricator 1 4.30 
5 (Public) 
Objective: To allow 
the public to assess 
the reputation loss 
level of the oil and 
gas company 
according to the 
reputation loss 
indicators provided 
Gender Male 7 9.70 
Female 65 90.3 
Age (years) 20–29 58 80.6 
30–39 13 18.1 
40–49 1 1.40 




Yes 67 93.1 
No 5 6.90 
Highest level 
of education 
PhD 5 6.90 
Master 23 31.9 
Degree 35 48.6 
Diploma 0 0.0 
Certificate 9 12.5  
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concluded that we do not reject the null hypothesis; therefore, the rat-
ings for the RL factors do not differ significantly within the same group 
of stakeholders, e.g., customers, employees and the public. 
Since the difference in the RL factor ratings between investors cannot 
be evaluated due to the inadequate number of respondents, the com-
parison of the factor ratings for all types of stakeholders, e.g., investors, 
customers, employees and the public, is implemented to identify the 
significant differences among the ratings given by the various stake-
holders. It is hypothesized that the null hypothesis is to be rejected, as 
the ratings differ among the types of stakeholders. Out of the 30 factors, 
14 have significance levels less than 0.05; hence, the null hypothesis was 
rejected as expected. It can be concluded that there are significant dif-
ferences in the ratings by types of stakeholders, and it is suggested that 
the factor RL impacts by the stakeholders are analysed individually, 
rather than generalizing them as a single value for all stakeholders. As 
expected, the same result was found in the hypothesis testing on the 
different types of survey. 
It is predicted that the RL factor ratings differ between the multiple 
(Type 1) and single (Types 2, 3, 4 and 5) stakeholder surveys. Nine 
factors had rejected null hypotheses, with significance level values less 
than 0.05. This shows that each type of survey holds individual rankings 
of RL factors, i.e., all stakeholders (Type 1), investors (Type 2), cus-
tomers (Type 3), employees (Type 4) and the public (Type 5). Conse-
quently, it is important to identify the priority of the RL factors 
according to single-stakeholder perceptions rather than a generalization 
of the factors’ ranking by various stakeholders due to the differences of 
perceptions and expectations among the stakeholders towards the 
pipeline operator. 
4.2. Prioritization of factors 
The result of the priority vector for all RL factors according to the 
investors’, customers’, employees’ and public’s perceptions is evaluated 
using various methods of analysis. It is hypothesized that there are 
significant differences between the priority vectors obtained from 
various stakeholders, as their expectations towards the O&G company 
vary. On the other hand, there is no significant difference between the 
priority vectors calculated by the AHP and FAHP methods using various 
computer-aided software, e.g., MS Excel and Super Decisions software, 
as expected. The significances of the differences in priority vectors 
among stakeholders have shown that factors B, C and C5 have signifi-
cance levels below 0.05; thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. Each 
stakeholder has different views on these factors compared to the other 
factors of RL. In contrast, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, as there 
is no significant difference between the priority vectors calculated using 
the various analysis methods. 
It is best to extract the ranks of the factors rather than the numerical 
values of the weights of the factors, due to the differences in the weight 
of each factor of each stakeholder depending on the analysis method 
used. The results show that factor A6 is the only factor that had a similar 
ranking from all stakeholders using the different types of analysis 
methods; it was generally ranked as having the least influence on the 
pipeline owner’s RL prior to pipeline explosion events. Factor D3 ap-
pears to be ranked as the first factor in the public-influenced category. 
If the first ranked for all factors’ influence categories is to be 
observed in the stakeholder-influenced category, both the customers 
and employees agreed that factor A had the most influence on the 
pipeline owner’s reputation, while the public selected factor C, and the 
investors chose factor B. The customers and the public have a common 
view of the factor B2, with both agreeing that this factor of the customer- 
influenced category has a greater impact on the pipeline owner’s 
reputation compared to factor B1; the employees and investors opined 
the opposite. In the employee-influenced category, factor C9 ranked as 
the first reason for the pipeline owner to lose reputation by the em-
ployees and public, while the customers perceived that factor C1 is the 
most influential factor of RL, and the investors chose factor C3. 
On the other hand, all stakeholders have different opinions of the 
investors’ influences on the pipeline owner’s RL. The investors and 
customers believed that factor A3 is the greatest reason for RL; the 
employees chose factor A1; and the public selected factor A5. Similarly, 
all stakeholders have different opinions of the consequence-influenced 
factors of RL on the pipeline owner’s reputation. The investors and 
customers chose factor D34, the employees selected factor D33, and the 
public chose both factors D31 and D34. 
The inconsistency in the perceptions between stakeholders should be 
acknowledged, and it is generally impossible to gain a single priority 
vector of RL factors to represent all stakeholders. In addition, the sole 
analysis method to obtain the priority vector has to be selected as well as 
the value to be implemented in the creation of the RL calculation for-
mula. The FAHP method of analysis is selected due to its robustness in 
the pairwise comparison process with the assistance of the data trans-
formation process. Combined with the TFN, it extrapolates the Likert- 
scale data into a linguistic scale and the fuzzy synthetic extent method 
for determining the weight vectors of the RL factors. Further analyses of 
this study utilized the weights of the RL factors obtained from the FAHP 
method as the chosen method. 
The local and global weights for all RL factors based on the percep-
tions of the investors, customers, employees and public are obtained, as 
shown in Table 2. The local weight is the normalized weight vector 
obtained from the previous analysis, while the global weight is the 
product of the factor’s weight and the parent criterion. For example, the 
global weight for factor A1 is calculated by multiplying the local weight 
of factor A by the local weight of factor A1. In summary, the local weight 
for factor A is the total of the global weights for the investor-influenced 
factors of RL (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6). These weights are later used 
in the formulation of the RL calculations, the development of the RLI, 
and the model as a pipeline consequence assessment. 
4.3. Validation of priority vectors 
To validate the priority vectors and rankings of the RL factors, ex-
perts were interviewed and simultaneously answered a survey for the 
importance of the RL factors and the individual stakeholders’ influence. 
The profiles of the ten participating experts in the validation processes 
are as follows: eight are pipeline engineers, one is a pipeline inspector, 
and the last is a pipeline technical authority. Their work experience in 
the O&G industry specifically on pipelines ranges between eight and 33 
years. Seven of the ten experts who participated in this validation stage 
work for O&G producer companies, one for a supplier, another for a 
fabricator, and the last is a consulting company’s employee. Most of the 
experts interviewed worked for the pipeline integrity consultancy 
owned by the Malaysia oil giant PETRONAS. Eight of them have worked 
in the O&G industry for at least ten years, particularly on PIMPs. The 
selection of the experts considers company factors other than the busi-
ness point of view to avoid bias in the analysis. 
From the results, both the experts and the respondents weighed 
nearly equal or approximate values of priority vectors for the RL factors 
as follows: A2, D33, D31 and D1. The percentages of difference are 
0.24%, 0.08%, 0.32% and 2.37%, respectively. An agreement in pref-
erences between the experts and respondents, i.e., investors, customers, 
employees and the public, can be seen from these results, which support 
the characteristics of a company’s reputation suggested by Fombrun 
(1996), investors are the company’s capital suppliers; hence, service 
interruption is the investor’s undesired event. The destruction of private 
property due to an explosion event tarnishes the reliability of the com-
pany entrusted by the customer. Employees are concerned with health 
and safety at work, and the responsibility of the owner is the public’s 
highest concern, including the avoidance of the repetition of a similar 
event. On the other hand, the largest differences between RL factors in 
percentage weights by the experts and respondents are 31.15%, 45.87%, 
35.10% and 39.38% for factors A, A2, D2 and C7, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Local and global weights for factors from investors.  
Stakeholder Criterion Sub-criterion Sub-subcriterion 
Factor Local Factor Local Global Factor Local Global 
Investor A 0.2489 A1 0.1789 0.0445      
A2 0.1657 0.0412      
A3 0.1794 0.0447      
A4 0.1675 0.0417      
A5 0.1529 0.0381      
A6 0.1557 0.0388    
B 0.2694 B1 0.5336 0.1438      
B2 0.4664 0.1257    
C 0.2306 C1 0.1131 0.0261      
C2 0.1135 0.0262      
C3 0.1212 0.0279      
C4 0.1212 0.0279      
C5 0.1053 0.0243      
C6 0.1141 0.0257      
C7 0.1070 0.0247      
C8 0.0993 0.0229      
C9 0.1079 0.0249    
D 0.2511 D1 0.2103 0.0528      
D2 0.1959 0.0492      
D3 0.2125 0.0534 D31 0.2645 0.0141      
D32 0.2439 0.0130      
D33 0.2271 0.0121      
D34 0.2645 0.0141   
D4 0.1993 0.0500      
D5 0.1820 0.0457    
Customer A 0.2604 A1 0.1709 0.0445      
A2 0.1631 0.0425      
A3 0.1731 0.0451      
A4 0.1656 0.0431      
A5 0.1693 0.0441      
A6 0.1580 0.0412    
B 0.2448 B1 0.4776 0.1169      
B2 0.5224 0.1279    
C 0.2480 C1 0.1153 0.0286      
C2 0.1082 0.0268      
C3 0.1154 0.0286      
C4 0.1126 0.0279      
C5 0.1110 0.0275      
C6 0.1141 0.0283      
C7 0.1072 0.0266      
C8 0.1052 0.0261      
C9 0.1110 0.0275    
D 0.2468 D1 0.1917 0.0473      
D2 0.1903 0.0470      
D3 0.2106 0.0520 D31 0.2534 0.0132      
D32 0.2449 0.0127      
D33 0.2481 0.0129      
D34 0.2536 0.0132   
D4 0.2026 0.0500      
D5 0.2048 0.0505    
Employee A 0.2557 A1 0.1807 0.0462      
A2 0.1744 0.0446      
A3 0.1767 0.0452      
A4 0.1556 0.0398      
A5 0.1616 0.0413      
A6 0.1510 0.0386    
B 0.2510 B1 0.5029 0.1262      
B2 0.4971 0.1247    
C 0.2396 C1 0.1080 0.0259      
C2 0.1047 0.0251      
C3 0.1099 0.0263      
C4 0.1058 0.0253      
C5 0.1061 0.0254      
C6 0.1173 0.0281      
C7 0.1180 0.0283      
C8 0.1111 0.0266      
C9 0.1190 0.0285    
D 0.2537 D1 0.1800 0.0457      
D2 0.1869 0.0474      
D3 0.2459 0.0624 D31 0.2482 0.0155      
D32 0.2337 0.0146      
D33 0.2598 0.0162      
D34 0.2583 0.0161 
(continued on next page) 
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5. Discussion 
For a better understanding of the stakeholders’ expectations and the 
identification of the major contributing factor to RL, the priority vector 
was rearranged ascendingly and summarized in Table 3. From the result, 
factor D3 was chosen by all the stakeholders as the first factor that im-
pacts the reputation of a pipeline owner prior to the failure event of a 
pipeline explosion, while the influences of the other factor categories 
differ among all respondents of the surveys. The investors were of the 
opinion that factors D31, “Multiple fatalities and injuries”, and D34, 
“Damaged vast environment area”, are equally important to the loss of a 
pipeline owner’s reputation, while the customers and public agreed that 
factor D34 has more impact than factor D31. The employees suggested 
that factor D33, “Destroyed private properties”, has the highest impact 
on the reputation. 
The investors place greater emphasis on the influence of factor B 
“Customers” in contributing to the loss of the pipeline owners’ reputa-
tion than the other major stakeholders. Conversely, the customers 
selected factor A, “Investors”, which is similar to the choice of the 
stakeholders and employees. Ironically, the public chose factor C, 
“Employees”, because they demand responsibility for pipeline safety. 
The investors who participated in the survey may have similar percep-
tions to first-time buyers of company shares, focusing on the financial 
behaviour of the company (Helm, 2007). This is confirmed when factor 
B1, “Loss of customers’ confidence”, is chosen by investors, clarifying 
the reason behind the selection of customers as the major reason for 
pipeline owners’ RL. This factor was selected by the employees as well. 
Instead of selecting factor B1, both the customers and public agreed that 
factor B2, “Bad word-of-mouth among customers”, contributes the most 
to the pipeline owners’ RL. Customer loyalty depends on the like ability 
of the company rather than the company’s competence (Zhang, 2009). 
The reputation of a company is more than merely a financial issue; it 
includes non-financial aspects such as “commitment to social and 
charitable issues” according to the investors (Helm, 2007). The com-
pany’s performance affects its ranking over time, and changes in 
perception are an indicator of how the company is perceived by the 
public (Fombrun, 2007). Various surveys of investors focus on lists of the 
most and least admired firms and annual rankings (Rourke, 2011). Thus, 
factor A3, “Downgraded owner’s ranking by ranking agencies”, is the 
investors’ aim, and it influences the pipeline owner’s reputation more 
than the second highest factor, A1, “Share price dropped and market 
capitalization affected”. A short-term share price deviation does not 
affect investors’ attitude towards a company in which they are 
emotionally invested (Helm, 2007). 
However, the employees suggest different factors than the investors 
Table 2 (continued ) 
Stakeholder Criterion Sub-criterion Sub-subcriterion 
Factor Local Factor Local Global Factor Local Global   
D4 0.1717 0.0436      
D5 0.2155 0.0547    
Public A 0.2548 A1 0.1687 0.0430      
A2 0.1630 0.0415      
A3 0.1691 0.0431      
A4 0.1668 0.0425      
A5 0.1707 0.0435      
A6 0.1616 0.0412    
B 0.2321 B1 0.4724 0.1096      
B2 0.5276 0.1224    
C 0.2638 C1 0.1118 0.0295      
C2 0.1038 0.0274      
C3 0.1111 0.0293      
C4 0.1091 0.0288      
C5 0.1121 0.0296      
C6 0.1139 0.0300      
C7 0.1102 0.0291      
C8 0.1113 0.0294      
C9 0.1167 0.0308    
D 0.2494 D1 0.1902 0.0474      
D2 0.1817 0.0453      
D3 0.2206 0.0550 D31 0.2513 0.0138      
D32 0.2468 0.0136      
D33 0.2483 0.0137      
D34 0.2535 0.0139   
D4 0.2026 0.0505      
D5 0.2050 0.0511     
Table 3 
Ranking of reputation loss factors by stakeholder.  
Factor Ranking 
Investor Customer Employee Public 
A 3 1 1 2 
B 1 4 2 4 
C 4 2 4 1 
D 2 3 3 3 
A1 2 2 1 3 
A2 4 5 3 5 
A3 1 1 2 2 
A4 3 4 5 4 
A5 6 3 4 1 
A6 5 6 6 6 
B1 1 2 1 2 
B2 2 1 2 1 
C1 4 2 6 4 
C2 3 7 8 9 
C3 2 1 4 6 
C4 2 4 7 8 
C5 8 6 9 3 
C6 5 3 3 2 
C7 7 8 2 7 
C8 9 9 5 5 
C9 6 5 1 1 
D1 2 4 4 4 
D2 4 5 3 5 
D3 1 1 1 1 
D4 3 3 5 3 
D5 5 2 2 2 
D31 2 2 3 2 
D32 3 4 4 4 
D33 4 3 1 3 
D34 2 1 2 1  
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and customers. The highest RL factor selected by employees is factor A1, 
“Share price dropped and market capitalization affected”, due to the 
expectations of the investors for the future growth and earnings pros-
pects of the company, followed by factor A3, “Downgraded owner’s 
ranking by ranking agencies” (Cordeiro and Schwalbach, 2000). A 
company’s stock price may suffer a substantial depreciation due to its 
inability to sustain credibility in the company’s management (Rose and 
Thomsen, 2004). Investors’ loyalty is determined by their decisions to 
sell or hold their company shares, which impacts the RL of the company 
(Helm, 2007). The public, in contrast, selected factor A5, “Loss contracts 
to operate new pipeline”, as making the highest contribution to the 
pipeline owner’s RL, while the company’s financial performance is not 
of public interest (Helm, 2007). 
Furthermore, a company has to tolerate a loss of investor confidence 
if management is incapable of persuading them in a credible way (Rose 
and Thomsen, 2004). This is certainly the reason for equal election be-
tween factors C3, “Accident facts hidden for personal interest”, and C4, 
“Company refuses to be responsible”, of the internal stakeholders’ or 
employees’ behaviour. In contrast, the customer chose only factor C3, 
“Accident facts hidden for personal interest”, as the main reason for a 
pipeline owner’s reputation. The stakeholders follow the behaviour of 
the executives to investigate the sincerity of a company’s intentions 
(Rourke, 2011). On the other hand, both employees and the public voted 
for factor C9, “Employee-caused accident”, as the major reason of 
pipeline owner RL; the employees hope for the trustworthiness of the 
company, while the public requests responsibility (Fombrun, 1996). 
All stakeholders who participated in the survey agreed that factor 
D3, “Accident severity”, has a great impact on a pipeline owner’s 
reputation, and it was ranked first in the public-influenced category. The 
post-accident impact had an extreme influence on internal and external 
stakeholders, as both parties are at a loss by the tragic event (Chai et al., 
2011). In contrast, factor A6, “Loss sponsorship opportunity”, ranked 
the least influential in the RL of pipeline owners prior to failure events, 
excluding the investor who chose factor A5, “Loss contracts to operate 
new pipeline”. In summary, it can be concluded that all stakeholders 
believe that this factor is not in the stakeholders’ interest. 
The AHP method was used to prioritize the factors of RL given by the 
respective stakeholders of pipeline owners via a pairwise comparison 
between factors with the assistance of the fuzzy triangular number that 
transformed the AHP fundamental scale value into a linguistic scale. The 
fuzzy synthetic extent method simplifies the process of obtaining the 
weight vector. This is the reason for choosing the FAHP method to select 
the priority vectors for this study. Future research to prove that FAHP 
method is the best way to prioritize factor rather than AHP is highly 
encouraged; highly consistent pairwise comparison matrix is an indi-
cator that the triangular FAHP is best to be used (Chan et al., 2019). The 
priority vectors or weights of the RL factors are inconsistent between 
stakeholders; thus, the RL evaluation should consider all stakeholders’ 
perceptions because a good reputation is the outcome when the com-
pany’s performance exceeds the stakeholders’ requirements and ex-
pectations (Rayner, 2003; Trotta and Cavallaro, 2012). 
6. Conclusion 
This article has successfully discussed the prioritization of the RL 
factors of a pipeline operator for onshore pipeline damage. Please be 
reminded that all factor values are considered independent. In conclu-
sion, both internal and external stakeholders agreed that the pipeline 
owner’s RL is highly influenced by factor D3, “Accident severity”, while 
factor A6, “Loss sponsorship opportunity”, was considered the least 
influential. The ranking method determines a factor’s priorities; the 
highest vector has the highest rank of RL factors. The effort to model the 
RL formulation can be designed based on the weights obtained from the 
points of view of four different pipeline operator stakeholders, namely, 
investors, customers, employees and the public. This prioritization of the 
RL factor process can assist the pipeline operator in determining the 
most influential post-accident reputation threat. Identifying the risk to 
the owner’s reputation is part of a risk-based inspection that can opti-
mize maintenance scheduling and reduce unnecessary inspections. 
Hence, the owner’s annual profit margins can be secured. 
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